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Abstract 
 
We consider the choices available to a defined contribution (DC) pension plan 
member at the time of retirement for conversion of his pension fund into a stream of 
retirement income. In particular, we compare the purchase at retirement age of a 
conventional life annuity (i.e., a bond-based investment) with distribution 
programmes involving differing exposures to equities during retirement. The residual 
fund at the time of the plan member's death can either be bequested to his estate or 
revert to the life office in exchange for the payment of survival credits while alive. 
The most important decision, in terms of cost to the plan member, is the level of 
equity investment. We also find that the optimal age to annuitise depends on the 
bequest utility and the investment performance of the fund during retirement. 
 
 Keywords: Stochastic pension plan design; defined contribution; discounted 
utility; life annuity; income drawdown; asset allocation; optimal annuitisation age. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In many countries, the principal retirement income vehicle in defined contribution 
(DC) pension plans is the life annuity. This is a bond-based investment with longevity 
insurance, and is the only financial instrument in existence that protects the retiree 
from outliving his resources: no other distribution programme will guarantee fixed 
retirement payments for however long an individual lives. Consequently, it is optimal 
– given a single safe asset and no bequest motive – for an individual to use all his 
wealth to purchase an annuity as soon as he retires (Yaari (1965)). 
 In the UK, the accumulated pension fund must be used to buy a life annuity 
from a life office by the time the plan member reaches the age of 75. The amount of 
the annuity will depend on the size of the fund, the long-term bond yield on the 
purchase date, the type of annuity (i.e., whether the payments are fixed or variable1), 
the age, sex and (occasionally) state of health of the annuitant, and a margin to cover 
the life office's profit and costs of marketing, administration, and investment 
management. 2 
However, relatively few individuals voluntarily annuitise their DC fund at the 
time of retirement, particularly in the US.3 One reason might be the high loading 
factor in quoted annuity rates (Friedman & Warshawsky (1990)), although Mitchell et 
al. (1999), using US data, and Finkelstein & Poterba (2002), using UK data, show that 
annuities are better value for money than is commonly supposed. Another possible 
reason is that many people have a strong bequest motive that reduces their desire to 
annuitise their wealth (Bernheim (1991)), although Brown (2001) finds that the 
                                                          
1
 It has become possible for life offices to sell index-linked annuities (which link payments to the 
variability in the retail price index) as a result of the introduction of long-dated index-linked 
government bonds that provide the essential matching assets. For more on index-linked bonds, see, for 
example, Anderson et al. (1996) and Cairns (1997). 
2
 Annuities involve risks for both the buyer and the seller. The plan member bears the risk of retiring 
when interest rates are low, so that the retirement annuity is permanently low. After he retires, he can 
also bear inflation risk: the risk of losses in the real value of his pension due to unanticipated later 
inflation. For their part, life offices selling annuities face reinvestment risk (the risk of failing to match 
asset cash flows with liability outgoings) and mortality risk (the risk that annuitants might live longer 
than expected). For a more detailed analysis of the problems facing annuity markets and some potential 
solutions to these problems, see, e.g., Blake (1999). 
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bequest motive is not a significant factor in the annuitisation decision. A third 
possibility is that people in poor health try to avoid buying annuities, because they do 
not expect to live very long (Brown (2001), Finkelstein & Poterba (2002)). Their 
findings confirm the predictions from Brugiavini’s (1993) theoretical model in which 
the health status of the individual follows a stochastic model, the parameters of which 
are known only to the individual. 
DC plans typically involve a sudden switch from an investment strategy based 
primarily on equities to one based entirely on bonds (see, for example, Blake, Cairns 
& Dowd (2001) and Cairns, Blake & Dowd (2000)). However, commentators have 
begun to question whether it is sensible to have a substantial bond-based investment 
over a long retirement period: after all, substantial improvements in longevity over the 
last century mean that retirees can typically expect to live for 15 years or more, and 
there are likely to be further improvements in the future. Furthermore, substantial falls 
in bond yields over the last decade have not only made bonds less attractive 
investment vehicles, but have also made annuities much more expensive to pension-
plan members.4 
The perceived poor value of traditional annuities has motivated a search for 
new investment-linked retirement-income programmes that involve the provision of 
retirement income from a fund with a substantial equity component. The attraction of 
such vehicles is obvious: there are very few historical periods where equities do not 
outperform bonds over long horizons.5 Nevertheless, equity prices tend to be much 
more volatile than bond prices, so the higher expected returns from equities involves 
greater risk. Further, some of these alternatives do not hedge mortality risk and so do 
not satisfy the basic requirement of a pension plan to provide a retirement income for 
however long the plan member lives. For example, any income drawdown programme 
that draws a fixed income from a fund heavily invested in equities has a strictly 
positive probability of running down to zero before the plan member dies (Milevsky 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3
 In the US there is no mandatory requirement to purchase an annuity by any age. Brown & 
Warshawsky (2001) predict that the switch in employer sponsorship in the US from defined benefit 
(DB) plans to DC plans will lead to even lower annuity purchases in the future. 
4
 For example, in the UK long-bond yields reached a forty-year low in 1999 pushing up annuity prices 
to corresponding highs. 
5
 Siegel (1997) shows that US equities generated higher average returns than US Treasury bonds and 
bills in 97% of all 30-year investment horizons since 1802. CSFB (2000) shows that similar results hold 
for the UK. 
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& Robinson (2000); Albrecht & Maurer (2001)). However, this danger of running out 
of assets before death can be ameliorated by requiring that the amount drawn from the 
fund be linked to the fund size at each point in time, or by imposing a requirement that 
the plan member annuitise by a certain age, as in the UK. 
In this paper we compare three different distribution programmes6 for a male 
DC plan member retiring at age 65:7 
• Purchased life annuity (PLA): On retirement at age 65 the plan member 
transfers his retirement fund to a life office in return for a level pension, and no 
bequest is payable at the plan member’s time of death. This programme is the 
benchmark against which the other programmes below are compared. 
• Equity-linked annuity (ELA) with a level, life annuity purchased at age 75: 
The assets are held in a managed fund containing both equities and bonds, and 
the plan member is protected from running out of money before age 75 by the 
requirement that annuity income fall in line with any fall in the fund value. We 
consider five different levels of equity exposure in the managed fund: 0%, 25%, 
50%, 75% and 100%. At the start of each year, the life office pays an actuarially 
fair survival credit to the plan member if he is still alive. The survival credit 
accounts for anticipated mortality over the coming year, and involves an extra 
return arising from the mortality risk-sharing implicit in an annuity: those who 
die early on create a profit that is shared amongst those annuitants who die 
later. This extra return is equal to the expected proportion of surviving 
                                                          
6
 In an earlier version of this paper (Blake, Cairns and Dowd, 2000), we analysed a larger range of 
distribution programmes. These included: (a) A programme in which income is fixed. The result is 
stability of income coupled with the risk of ruin before death. With most forms of plan member utility 
function analysed, the possibility of ruin results in very low discounted expected utility (in some cases 
minus infinity) making such programmes extremely unattractive. (b) Variants on the equity-linked 
annuity and income-drawdown programmes involving the use of derivatives to limit downside risk in 
the fund. Such programmes were found to give results similar to, but slightly worse than, funds 
excluding derivative investments with a similar annual standard deviation in returns. (c) A programme 
which purchased at 65 a deferred annuity from age 75 and consumed the remaining fund entirely 
between ages 65 and 75. None of these alternatives proved to be as effective as those discussed in detail 
in this paper. 
7
 We treat any non-pensions-related personal savings by adding them to the pension fund at retirement. 
We also treat the residential home as a fixed asset that becomes a bequest on death. This bequest is the 
same under all of the programmes described below and so has no differential effect. We also assume for 
simplicity that the pensioner consumes all his pension income each year, and (generally) ignore any 
other sources of income – although at the end of Section 4 we also look at the impact on our results of a 
fixed (e.g., State) annuity that cannot be commuted for cash. 
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annuitants who die in that year, and is therefore increasing in age.8 In return for 
these survival credits the residual fund reverts to the life office when the plan 
member dies, so he leaves no bequest. 
• Equity-linked income-drawdown (ELID) with a level, life annuity 
purchased at age 75: This programme is otherwise similar to the ELA 
programme, except for the fact that the plan member does not receive any 
survival credit or surrender his bequest to the life office if he dies before age 75. 
Should he die before that age, his residual fund is paid as a bequest to his estate. 
Our analysis leads to a number of significant conclusions and – to anticipate 
the later discussion – the most important ones are: 
• The optimal programme depends on the plan member’s attitude to risk: the 
greater his risk appetite, the greater his preferred exposure to equities. 
• The cost of adopting a suboptimal programme is generally much less 
significant than the cost associated with an inappropriate equities exposure: it is 
therefore very important for the plan member to get the equities exposure right.  
• The optimal choice of distribution programme is fairly insensitive to the plan 
member’s bequest motive. 
• The plan member’s optimal choices are relatively insensitive to differences 
between his own and the life office’s assessment of his mortality prospects. 
• Compulsory annuitisation by any particular age can be costly for plan members 
with a relatively high appetite for risk, but impose no costs on members who 
are more risk averse. 
• The optimal annuitisation age is very sensitive to the plan member's degree of 
risk aversion, moderately sensitive to the bequest motive, and dependent on the 
size of the retirement fund accumulated by the time the annuitisation decision is 
made. 
 The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the stochastic 
framework underlying our analysis, Section 3 analyses the three key pension 
distribution programmes available to a DC plan member, and Section 4 presents and 
discusses numerical results. Section 5 then presents our conclusions.  
 
                                                          
8
 For more details, see Blake (1999). 
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2. Stochastic Assumptions 
 
 
2.1 Asset returns 
 
We assume that there are two assets available for investment: risk-free bonds and 
equity. The bond fund, )(tM , grows at the continuously compounded constant risk-
free rate of r  per annum, so that at time t , )exp()0()( rtMtM = , where )0(M  is the 
initial price. Equity prices, )(tS , satisfy geometric Brownian motion, so that 
))(exp()0()( tZtStS σµ += , where )0(S  is the initial price and )(tZ  is standard 
Brownian motion. It follows that the gross annual returns on equities are independent 
and identically distributed log-normal random variables with mean )2/exp( 2σµ +  
and variance ]1))[exp(2exp( 22 −+ σσµ . 
For simplicity, we assume that the pension is drawn at the start of each year 
and that pension plan assets are rebalanced annually to maintain predetermined 
proportions in each asset class. We assume that the annual life office charge on equity 
investment for all distribution programmes is constant at 1% of fund value, implying a 
reduction in yield of 1%.9 
In our simulations, we used the following parameters (net of expenses): 
 
 
Table 1 hereabouts 
 
 
These figures imply that the expected gross return on equities is 1.11 and the standard 
deviation of the total return is 0.275. These parameter values are consistent with 
historical returns on UK Treasury bills and equities over the last half century and 
include the 1% reduction in equity returns. 
                                                          
9
 Some of the distribution programmes that we consider, such as income drawdown, can be very 
expensive with charges considerably in excess of 1% p.a. Nevertheless, to preserve comparability, we 
assume a 1% charge for income drawdown as well. See Blake (1999) or Appendix A of Blake, Cairns 
& Dowd (2000). 
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2.2 Mortality and financial functions 
 
We also make use of the following mortality and financial functions: 
• xq  and xp  are the year-on-year mortality and survival probabilities 
respectively.10 The values of these probabilities are the same as those used in 
the most appropriate UK mortality table for compulsory-purchase, male 
annuitants (i.e., PMA92Base: see McCutcheon et al. (1998, 1999)). 
• 1... −+××= txxxt ppp  is the probability that the pensioner survives to age tx +  
given that he is alive at age x . 
• xtxtxt ppq 1| +−=  is the probability that the pensioner will die between ages tx +  
and 1++ tx  given that he is alive at age x . 
• 
rt
t yty
epa −∞
=
∑= 0  is the fair price at age y  of a level single-life life annuity of 
£1 per annum, payable annually in advance. 
We assume in this study that mortality rates will not improve over time.11 
 
 
 
3. Distribution Programmes 
 
 
 
Our analysis is based on a typical 65-year old male who is assumed to have 
accumulated a personal pension fund on his retirement date (denoted 0=t  below) of 
000,100£)0( =F  and is about to retire. Our plan member has to choose between the 
following three distribution programmes. 
 
                                                          
10
 Thus xp  is the probability that an individual aged x  survives for one year, and xx pq −= 1  is the 
corresponding probability of death. 
11
 For recent work on stochastic mortality improvements, see Milevsky & Promislow (2001), Yang 
(2001) and Wilkie  et al. (2003). 
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3.1 Programme 1: Purchased life annuity (PLA) 
 
In Programme 1, )0(F  is used immediately to purchase a level life annuity at a price 
of xa  per £1 of pension. The pension is therefore xB aFPtP /)0()( ==  for =t 0,1,2, 
... and is payable until death. No bequest is payable, but the surviving plan member 
receives implicit survival credits instead. 
 
 
3.2 Programme 2: Equity-linked annuity (ELA) 
 
Programme 2 is designed to benefit from equity investment but also adjusts the 
pension paid to remove the possibility of running out of funds before age 75. Under 
this programme, the pension, )(tP , is adjusted each year to reflect both the fund size 
available at the beginning of the year as the plan member ages. The procedure for 
calculating each year's pension payment ensures that both )(tP  and )(tF  are always 
positive. The programme also allows for different degrees of equity weighting (ω ). 
Hence:  
 
txa
tF
tP
+
=

)()(                                                       (1) 
))()(()1()( tPtF
p
q
tB
tx
tx
−−=
+
+δ
                                      (2) 
))()()(()1()(
)1()1( tBtPtFe
tS
tS
tF r +−



−+
+
=+ ωω                        (3) 
)1()1( +=+ tFtD δ                                             (4) 
 
for =t 0,1,…,9, where 0=δ  if survival credits are payable (ELA) and 1=δ  if 
bequests are payable (ELID; see section 3.3 below). )(tB  is the actuarially fair 
survival credit paid into the plan member's fund at the start of every year if the plan 
member is still alive (i.e., the fund is increased from )(tF  to )()( tBtF +  at time t  if 
the plan member is still alive at that time). )1( +tF  is the residual fund which reverts 
 9 
to the life office if the plan member dies during the year.  
 At time 10=t  (age 75), if the plan member is still alive, the residual fund, 
)10(F , is used to purchase a level, single-life annuity at prevailing terms. No bequests 
are payable after time 10, but the plan member continues to receive the survival 
credits implicit in the annuity. 
 Note that for the case when 0=ω  we get BPtP =)(  for all t  (i.e., the PLA 
and ELA programmes are identical). 
 
 
3.3. Programme 3: Equity-lined income-drawdown (ELID) 
 
The above set of equations can also be used to describe Programme 3 if we set 1=δ . 
)1( +tD  represents the bequest payable to his estate at 1+t  if the plan member dies 
between times t  and 1+t . 
 This programme will provide a level pension if the return on the assets is equal 
to the risk-free rate adjusted for the mortality drag12: i.e., if: 
 
       
tx
r
r
p
e
e
tS
tS
+
=−+
+ )1()(
)1(
ωω
                                           (5) 
 
This condition for returns in equation (5) to achieve a level pension lies in contrast 
with Programme 2. In Programme 2 risky assets need only generate a return equal to 
the risk-free rate (i.e., retStS =+ )(/)1( ) to provide a level pension, because of the 
survival credits embodied in the ELA. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 This is the additional return required on an investment to compensate for giving up the survival credit 
implicit in a life annuity. In a given year, it equals the percentage of the annuitant group alive at the 
beginning of the year who die during the year and hence increases steeply with age.  
 10 
 
4 Numerical Results 
 
 
4.1 The value function 
 
To compare these programmes, we use the log-normal distribution of )(/)1( tStS +  
and the translated log-normal distribution of )(/)1()1( tStSer ++− ωω  to calculate 
the plan member's discounted lifetime utility. This notion of utility captures the plan 
member's welfare throughout retirement and is similar to that employed by Merton 
(1990) and others. 
We measure value relative to the standard life annuity that pays a fixed amount 
65/)0( aFPB =
 11 
    



−


 +
= 1)()())((
2
2
2
222
γ
γ
d
dtDhtDJ ,  with  02 >d .                    (8) 
 
The value function used in equation (6) is typical of those used in optimal stochastic 
control theory (e.g., Merton, 1971) for general increasing and concave utility functions 
(.)1J  and (.)2J , and is also consistent with Merton (1983), Kapur & Orszag (1999) 
and Milevsky & Young (2002) in the pensions context.14 ))((1 tPJ  comes from the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class of utility functions (i.e., power and log 
utility functions). The plan member's relative risk aversion (RRA) parameter is 11 γ− . 
))((2 tDJ  comes from the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class (which 
includes the CRRA class as a special case). The parameter β  measures the plan 
member's subjective rate of time preference and 2k  is used to specify the appropriate 
balance between the desire for income and the desire to make a bequest. 
 The functions )( 11 γh  and )( 22 γh  have a considerable impact on the analysis, 
unless 02 =k , in which case the specifications of )( 11 γh  and )( 22 γh  irrelevant.15 We 
assume: 
 
    
1
1
11 1
1)( γγ dh −=                                                  (9)  
 
                                                          
14
 A different approach to assessing the value to an individual of a series of cashflows has been 
proposed by Epstein & Zin (1989) and which also allows a clear separation of risk attitudes from 
intertemporal substitution effects. However, investigation of the present pensions problem using the 
Epstein-Zin framework is beyond the scope of this paper. 
15
 An essential requirement for each function is that it takes the same sign as its argument, and a 
conventional parameterisation of 1J  and 2J  would be 111 /1)( γγ =h  and 222 /1)( γγ =h . We 
experimented with these forms in preliminary work, but found that they resulted in strongly 
dichotomous preferences. Plan members with a low RRA had a very strong preference for the ELA 
programme (offering no bequests), while plan members with a high RRA had a very strong preference 
for the ELID programme (offering bequests). However, we do not believe that real world behaviour is 
so extreme: we would expect to see some individuals with low RRA still wishing to make a bequest and 
vice versa. We believe it is important to choose forms for )( 11 γh  and )( 22 γh  that avoid such extreme 
swings in preference over the range of RRA parameter values, leaving 2k  as the main parameter 
determining the choice between the different programmes. 
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1)0(
1)(
2
2
2
22
−


 += γγ
d
dF
h .                                   (10)  
 
The parameter, 1d , can be freely determined within the range 10 1 << d  for )( 11 γh  to 
take the correct sign, and the parameter, 2d , can be interpreted as the value of the plan 
member's non-pension assets such as his house. 
 We can now make the following remarks about the properties of (.)1J  and 
(.)2J : 
• 1)()1/()( 11111 11 −=−= BB PJddPdJ γγ : Thus, )(1 PJ  increases by 1 in absolute 
terms when P  increases from BPd1  to BP . 
• 0)0(2 =J : This is a consequence of our requirement that 02 >d .16 Imposing  
0)0(2 =J  means that when we value the benchmark PLA programme, the 
(.)2J  component of the discounted utility is unaffected by the timing of death. 
Additionally, any strictly positive bequest has a strictly positive impact on the 
discounted utility function relative to the benchmark. 
•  1))0((2 =FJ : (.)2J  increases by 1 as the size of the bequest changes from 0 to 
)0(F  (i.e., if the member died on the same day that the programme started). 
The value of 2k  (and, to a lesser extent, 2γ ) will reflect the family 
characteristics of the plan member: for example, a married man with young children is 
likely to have a greater bequest motive and hence a higher value of 2k  than a single 
man with no children. The choice for 2k  will be discussed further in Section 4.3. 
So far as the authors are aware, no standard definition exists for the relative 
risk aversion parameter attached to the value of a series of cashflows rather than to a 
single cashflow using a value function of the type in equation (6). We therefore 
propose the following definition. Consider the PLA programme where BPtP =)(  is 
                                                          
16
 Suppose, in contrast, we used 02 =d  in combination with 02 <γ . This implies that −∞=)0(2J . 
However, we know that many plan members do choose to annuitise their entire liquid assets thereby 
leaving a bequest of zero. Making such a choice is inconsistent with having −∞=)0(2J .  
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constant and no bequest is payable. Then the value function is a function of BP  only:
17
 
 



=≡ ∑
=
− 0at  alive  ),0()())0(,0()(~
0
1
K
t
B
t
B FPJeEFVPV
β
               (11) 
 
We now define the relative risk aversion parameter to be )(~/)(~. BBB PVPVP ′′′− , 
where primes indicate derivatives. For the value function in Equation (6) the relative 
risk aversion parameter is therefore 11 γ−  for all BP . Where a bequest is payable we 
still take 11 γ−  as the RRA parameter while acknowledging that this reflects only the 
pre-death risks. 
 The optimal programme maximises the value function ))0(,0( FV . 
 
 
4.2 General comments on the results 
 
In the following experiments we have assumed γγγ == 21 , and, as plausible 
illustrative values, 52 =k , 75.01 =d  and 100002 =d .18 Mortality is assumed to be 
independent of the investment scenario and we also assume for the moment that the 
true mortality model for (and known to) the plan member is the same as that used by 
the life office in calculating annuity rates. We refer to this as standard mortality. We 
then evaluated the value function ))0(,0( FV  across a range of values for the RRA 
parameter, γ−1 , varying from 0.25 to 25. This range embraces both very risk-averse 
and very risk-tolerant preferences and is consistent with values found in studies by 
Blake (1996) for the UK and (among others) Brown (2001) for the US.19 Finally, we 
also fixed the value of β  at 05.1log .20 
                                                          
17
 The bequest utility function is not included here since the PLA programme means that 0)1( =+kD  
for all 2k , and 0)0(2 =J . 
18
 The sensitivity of our results to these particular parameter values is assessed below. 
19
 Some of the published values are controversial, and Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) have recently 
suggested that the literature tends to over-estimate RRAs. However, even their ‘plausible’ estimates 
(that is, RRA < 3) are still within our assumed range.  
20
 Blake (forthcoming) estimates the marginal rate of time preference of a typical UK household to be 
 14 
Numerical results are presented in Table 2 for the discounted utilities of the 
different programmes for an illustrative RRA coefficient of 3.96. These values were 
calculated using a backwards recursion: 
 
]1at  alive),(|))1(,1([))(())(,( 651 +++++= +− sxsFsFsVEpsPJesFsV ssβ  
+ ]at  alive),(|)1([)1(65 sxsFsFEeq ss +++−+ δβ                  (12) 
 
The optimal strategy for the plan member in this case is to select the ELA programme 
with 25% in equities. 
 
 
Table 2 hereabouts  
 
 
Figure 1 shows the plot of the differences between the value functions for each 
equity-linked programme and the benchmark PLA programme (i.e., 
))0(,0())0(,0( FVFV BP − ) over our assumed range of values for the RRA parameter 
γ−1 . Panel (a) shows the plot for the ELA programme, panel (b) the plot for the 
ELID programme, and the top bold line indicates the best programme for a given 
degree of relative risk aversion. The Figure reveals the following: 
• For our illustrative value of 52 =k , all the optimal policies use survival credits 
rather than bequests. 
• For an RRA less than about 1.25, the best programme is an equity-linked 
annuity with 100% equities; for an RRA greater than 1.25 but less than about 
10, the ELA programme remains optimal provided the equity weighting is 
gradually lowered as RRA increases; and for an RRA greater than about 10 
(i.e., for more risk averse plan members), the best programme is the PLA.21  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
about 3%. This is consistent with the use here of 05.1log=β  in combination with an assumed rate of 
inflation of 2% (although an inflation assumption is not required for the present analysis). 
21
 However, Blake's (1996) estimates of RRA values against wealth suggest that only about 5% of 
individuals will want any equities exposure, and an even smaller proportion will want 100% equities 
exposure. 
 15 
 
Figure 1 hereabouts 
 
 
The optimal equity proportions for different RRA’s are shown in Figure 2. The 
solid line indicates the best portfolio mix in the unrestricted range 0% to 100% as a 
function of the RRA. With 52 =k , the optimal distribution programme for all levels 
of RRA is the ELA rather than the ELID programme. The dots indicate the best 
portfolio mix when the plan member is restricted to choosing one of the five ELA 
programmes with 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% equities. For example, the best 
available programme for a plan member with an RRA of 10, who would otherwise 
choose an equity proportion of 15% if free to do so, is the ELA with an equity 
proportion of 25%. The best available programme for a plan member with a slightly 
higher RRA is the one with a 0% equity proportion. 
 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
For any specific RRA, Figure 1 can be used to rank the programmes in order 
of preference. However, the differences in expected discounted utilities give us little 
feel for how much worse, say, the 75%-equities ELID programme is relative to the 
optimal (i.e., 25%-equities ELA) programme. A more intuitive comparison is given by 
the cash compensation criterion: how much extra cash (measured proportional to the 
initial fund value) would a plan member need at time 0 in order for the 75%-equities 
ELID to have the same expected discounted utility as the optimal ELA programme? 
This question is answered in Figure 3: a plan member with an RRA of 3.96 would 
require an extra 25% in his retirement fund for a 75%-equities ELID programme to 
match the optimal ELA outcome attainable with the retirement fund he actually has. 
 
 
Figure 3 hereabouts 
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Figure 3 is more informative than Figure 1 because it gives a cash-equivalent 
comparison of the relative quality of each programme. Thus, we can see that for plan 
members with a relatively strong appetite for risk (i.e., a low RRA of around 0.25), 
programmes such as the PLA would require as much as 50% to 70% extra cash to 
match their preferred Programme 2 (ELA with 100% equities). This finding should 
not be too surprising: (relatively) risk-loving plan members have a strong preference 
for equity exposure, and therefore need considerable compensation if they are to adopt 
a bond-based investment strategy. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Figure 3 shows that a very risk-averse plan 
member would prefer Programme 1 (PLA) (or equivalently the ELA programme with 
0% equities), and therefore need considerable compensation to accept any equity 
exposure. The compensation needed also rises with the degree of risk aversion and the 
specified equity exposure, and can be very large indeed. 
To summarise: the plan member must decide on the programme type (PLA, 
ELA or ELID) and (for the latter two programmes) the equity proportion, and our 
findings suggest that the choice of equity proportion is far more important than the 
choice of programme type.22 
 
 
4.3. Importance of bequests 
 
Empirical studies (see Brown (2001) and the references cited therein) are inconclusive 
on the importance attached by retirees to bequests, so it is difficult to judge with the 
current state of knowledge what typical values for 2k  should be. We examined the 
impact of changing 2k  to 20 and 100 (see Figure 4, and Figure 3(b) for 52 =k ) and 
found that the effect of 2k  on costs is quite gradual. We can therefore infer that our 
results and observations are not over-sensitive to changes in 2k  and, hence, that mis-
                                                          
22
 These conclusions are not particularly sensitive to the size of the equity risk premium: the only 
notable difference associated with a decreased equity risk premium (we considered 0285.0=µ  instead 
of the standard value of 0746.0=µ  used elsewhere) is to decrease (respectively increase) the cost of 
suboptimality for plan members with low (respectively high) degrees of risk aversion by a relatively 
small amount. However, this difference aside, our broad conclusions remain much the same. 
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specification of 2k  is unlikely to be as costly for the plan member as an inappropriate 
choice of equity mix. 
 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
4.4 Adverse mortality selection: impaired lives 
 
The calculations above assumed that the plan member's mortality probabilities equal 
those used by the life office to calculate annuity prices. However, a typical group of 
plan members will include some in good health and others in poor health. For the 
latter group, the purchase of a life annuity at retirement at standard rates represents 
poor value relative to other plan members in better health. It is often suggested, 
therefore, that those in poor health should defer annuitisation for as long as possible. 
 Consider an individual for whom mortality rates are approximately four times 
those assumed by the life office.23 This degree of impairment is consistent with, for 
example, an individual who has just been diagnosed as suffering from Alzheimer's 
Disease (Macdonald & Pritchard (2000)). Results for such an individual are presented 
in Figure 5, which was constructed using the same set of parameters ( 52 =k , 
100002 =d  and 0488.0=β ) as Figure 3. We make the following observations. 
First, if the choice of programme (ELA or ELID) is given, the optimal equity 
proportion (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%) for plan members with different levels of 
risk aversion is unaffected by differences between impaired and standard mortality. 
This is a direct consequence of power utility, which generates constant portfolio 
proportions. 
Second, comparing Figures 5(a) and 3(a), we see that, if we are restricted to 
the use of an ELA programme, then the optimal equity mix is largely unaltered. 
However, the cost of choosing a sub-optimal ELA programme with impaired mortality 
is about one-third lower than with standard mortality. 
                                                          
23
 Strictly we assume that, 4)( PLAximpairedx pp = , that is, the force of mortality is 4 times the standard 
force used by the life office in its annuity pricing. For small PLAxq , this implies that )(4 PLAximpairedx qq ≈ . 
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Third, Figure 5(b) compares each of the ELID programmes with the best ELA 
programme for each level of risk aversion. The cost of choosing a sub-optimal ELID 
programme with impaired mortality is about 50%+ lower than with standard mortality 
(cf., Figure 3(b)). As the degree of impairment increases, plan members are more 
likely to prefer the ELID programme. However, except for those with very strong 
bequest motives (i.e., high 2k ), the degree of impairment needs to be quite strong 
before the plan member switches from the ELA to the ELID programme. It is also 
possible that an impaired life would benefit more from programmes that allow for the 
accelerated payment of pension. The most beneficial improvement from the point of 
view of the plan member would be the payment of higher (i.e., fairer) survival credits 
from the life office to reflect the higher mortality rates (as is the case with impaired 
life annuities) rather than from a programme with bequests. At the same time, 
individuals with a lower degree of impairment are still likely to prefer the ELA 
programme to the ELID one: the survival credits can still be worth having even 
though they are actuarially unfair. 
 
 
Figure 5 here 
 
 
4.5 Optimal  annuitisation and the cost of regulation 
 
A number of authors have tackled the problem of when a plan member would choose 
to annuitise, assuming he were free to annuitise or not as he wished. Different authors 
have tacked this issue in different ways, and Table 3 lists six key features of the 
various models to address this issue. Table 4 indicates how these features are 
incorporated into each study (and also into this one), and gives the main conclusions 
reached regarding the optimal annuitisation age. 
 From these tables we can see that the optimal annuitisation age depends on (a) 
the annuity options available to the plan member, (b) his risk aversion and, as we will 
see in Section 4.6, (c) the existence and form of the bequest utility. 
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Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 here 
 
 
  To investigate this issue further, we compared the following three choices: 
• Annuitise immediately (i.e., Programme 1). 
• Employ the ELA or ELID programme with the optimal equity mix up to age 75 
and then annuitise. 
• Employ the ELA or ELID programme with the optimal equity mix and 
annuitise at the optimal age between age 65 and 85, with compulsory 
annuitisation at age 85 if voluntary annuitisation has not occurred beforehand. 
The annuitisation age is decided at age 65 and this decision is, for the moment, 
assumed to be irreversible. 
We begin by comparing the ELA and PLA programmes. We find that it is 
optimal either to annuitise immediately or to wait until age 85, but never to annuitise 
at some intermediate age. This is consistent with Merton’s (1983) approach. The cost 
of compulsory annuitisation at age 75 then turns out to lie between 0% and 15% of the 
initial fund value depending on the level of risk aversion. 
Next we compare the ELID and PLA programmes. Table 5 shows results for 
the case where the plan member has the right to invest freely up to age 85 and to 
annuitise at any age up to 85, but attaches no value to bequests (i.e., 02 =k ). This 
means that the decision to defer annuitisation is driven purely by a comparison 
between the loss of future expected excess equity returns and the gain from future 
survival credits under the PLA. The final column of the Table reports the cost of a 
regulation compelling plan members to annuitise at age 75. For example, a plan 
member with a very low RRA of 0.25 would require an extra 1.6% of his retirement 
fund to compensate for annuitising at 75 rather than 85. The Table indicates that the 
optimal annuitisation age is very sensitive to the level of risk aversion, but that the 
overall cost of forced annuitisation at 75 (when there is no bequest motive) is 
relatively small and declines to zero for RRAs above unity. 
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Table 5 here 
 
 
It is also interesting to note that at very low levels of RRA, the optimal 
annuitisation age of 79 is close to the age we would get (namely, 81) by applying 
Milevsky's (1998) rule, which specifies that we switch at the point where the mortality 
drag matches the expected excess return on equities over bonds. However, our 
analysis shows that this decision rule matches the one presented here only for a plan 
member who is risk neutral (i.e., RRA = 0). Our more general analysis demonstrates 
that decision making is much more complex than the Milevsky rule suggests, with the 
equity mix and the optimal annuitisation age critically dependent on both the level of 
risk aversion and the bequest motive. 
Table 6 shows that, when the bequest motive is positive, the optimal age to 
switch from an ELID programme to the PLA generally increases, since the option to 
delay annuitisation becomes more valuable. The switching age is greater for very low 
and high RRAs (i.e., below 4.99 and above 12.53, respectively) than is the case 
without a bequest motive, and is not much affected for intermediate RRAs.24 This 
increase in the optimal annuitisation age is not surprising. Under the PLA that the plan 
member switches into, the expected discounted utility is not affected by the inclusion 
of a bequest utility since the utility attached to a zero bequest is zero. In contrast the 
expected discounted utility under the ELID programme immediately increases as a 
result of the inclusion of a bequest utility. This makes continuation with the ELID 
programme for at least another year relatively more attractive at all ages. However, the 
results in Table 6 also indicate that even where it is positive, the cost of compulsory 
annuitisation by age 75 is also fairly low: for example, even in the ‘worst case’ where 
RRA=0.25 and the optimal annuitisation age is 80, enforced annuitisation by age 75 
costs only 2.4% of initial fund value.  
 
                                                          
24
 The U-shaped pattern of optimal annuitisation ages in Table 6  is an artefact of the way in which the 
functions )(1 γh  and )(2 γh  have been parameterised. As the RRA increases ( γ  decreases), plan 
members, besides investing more conservatively, place greater emphasis on the bequest, since )(2 γh  is 
increasing in RRA. 
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Table 6 here 
 
 
4.6 Annuitisation under dynamic stochastic optimisation 
 
The preceding discussion assumed for simplicity that plan members decide at 65 the 
future age at which they will annuitise, and then adhere to this decision regardless of 
future circumstances. However, it is more plausible to suppose that when they are 65 
they merely anticipate the age at which they will annuitise – unless of course they 
annuitise immediately – and then make a firm annuitisation decision later. Suppose 
therefore that at the end of each year any pre-annuitised plan member reconsiders 
annuitisation taking into account the information available at that time. Within the 
present modelling framework, this means that the decision at time t  will depend on 
the current fund size, )(tF , and the current age of the plan member, t+65 . Since 
)(tF  is random, the plan member does not necessarily know in advance the optimal 
age at which to annuitise. 
The optimisation process then proceeds as follows: 
• Let the optimal value function at time t  be denoted ))(,(ˆ tFtV . 
• Start at the age, Tx += 65 , by which annuitisation is compulsory. For each 
possible fund size at that time calculate the value function 
))(,(ˆ))(,( TFTVTFTV = . 
• Next work backwards recursively: 
o Assume that the optimal value function ))1(,1(ˆ ++ tFtV  is known for all 
)1( +tF . Now consider the decision at time t  when the fund size is )(tF . 
We need to compare the value function (a) assuming that the plan member 
annuitises immediately with the value function (b) assuming that the plan 
member defers annuitisation until at least time 1+t  and then acts 
optimally thereafter. Under (b) we have several factors to take into 
account: the probability of survival, the pension payment at time t , and 
the possible bequest if the plan member dies before time 1+t . The plan 
member chooses the option (a) or (b) that maximises the value function, 
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thus producing the optimal value for ))(,(ˆ tFtV . 
o This procedure is repeated over the full range of possible values for )(tF . 
• Once this has been done, we can step backwards by one year, repeat the 
previous step and continue in this way until we reach the age of 65 at which 
point we stop.25  
One reason why the annuity decision is likely to depend upon the fund size 
)(tF  is that the bequest utility does not exhibit constant RRA. Our results indicate 
that a plan member is more likely to prefer to delay (bring forward) annuitisation if his 
investments have been performing well (badly). To illustrate this, suppose the fund 
size is almost zero and a plan member is considering a switch from the ELID 
programme to the PLA programme. On the one hand, the negative impact on the 
bequest utility will be negligible because the fund size is very small. On the other 
hand, the payment of survival credits through the PLA will have a strong beneficial 
impact on the utility of consumption, because the marginal utility of consumption gets 
large as the fund size gets small. So both bequest and marginal utility of consumption 
considerations make the plan member keener to annuitise, relative to a plan member 
with more wealth. 
The dependence of the annuitisation decision on fund size is illustrated in 
Figure 6, which shows the outcome of the above optimisation process at selected 
RRAs. Consider a plan member with an RRA of 3.15 who is now aged 75 and who 
has not previously annuitised. If his current fund size is below about £90,000, he 
should annuitise immediately. But if his current fund is above this level, then it is 
optimal for him to defer annuitisation. We can also see that the annuitisation region 
varies considerably with the RRA. We also observe from these graphs that for any 
given age and RRA, annuitisation will either: 
• not be optimal for any fund size; 
• be optimal for all fund sizes; or 
• be optimal for low fund sizes but not for fund sizes above some threshold. 
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Figure 6 here 
 
 
In each graph the dots show how the plan member's fund value would change 
over time if he had opted at age 65 for the PLA. This gives a useful reference point for 
projecting the stochastic fund size under the ELID programme at different ages. Thus 
with an RRA of 1.58, we can see that annuitisation is likely to occur some time 
between the ages of 72 (if equities perform poorly) and 80 (if equities perform 
moderately well). However, if equities perform sufficiently well then the fund-age 
trajectory will lie above the shaded region and annuitisation might only take place 
when it is compulsory at age 85. In the adjacent plot where the RRA is 3.15, the 
shaded annuitisation 'hill' is somewhat lower, implying that a relatively large 
proportion of the stochastic trajectories of )(tF  will avoid hitting the hill (i.e., and so 
avoid annuitisation) at ages below 85. On the other hand, if )(tF  is going to hit the 
hill it, will probably do so within the first 3 or 4 years. We can infer from these 
observations that in some (i.e., low RRA) cases the dynamic stochastic element in the 
annuitisation decision will not add much value (the plan member will choose to 
annuitise at around age 80 regardless). However, in other (high RRA) cases, the shape 
and height of the annuitisation hill are such that the majority of stochastic fund-age 
trajectories cross over the hill without hitting it, suggesting that the extra timing 
choice captured by the dynamic stochastic element is a potentially valuable feature.  
The shapes of these annuitisation regions depend upon the principal 
motivation for choosing to defer annuitisation, bearing in mind that members will 
defer the switch from ELID to PLA for two possible reasons: continued equity 
participation; and the desire to leave a bequest. The first of these is the primary 
motivation for low RRA plan members: for these there is a largely vertical 
annuitisation region because the decision to defer is largely unaffected by the past 
performance of the fund. On the other hand, for high RRA members, continued equity 
participation is not a reason for deferral as they would choose a very low equity mix. 
Instead the reason to defer is mainly based on the desire to leave a bequest. This 
                                                                                                                                                                      
25
 Throughout this exercise, we assume that the equity mix up to the time of annuitisation is held 
constant. Strictly this may, itself, not be optimal, but in the context of power utility on the pension 
component of the utility function this approximation will be reasonable. 
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motive makes the annuitisation decision dependent on the current fund size and 
results in the emergence of the ‘hill’ shape in Figure 6. However, if we compare the 
optimal utility for the fully optimal case in Figure 6 with the deterministic decision 
made at age 65 (Table 6), we find that the added flexibility is not an especially 
valuable option (almost 0% for RRA up to 8 increasing to 4% added value for 
RRA=25). 
 
4.7 Sensitivity analysis 
 
We have already tested for sensitivity of our results with respect to the level of risk 
aversion, the equity risk premium, the weight attached to the bequest, the plan 
member's health status and the timing of annuitisation. We will comment briefly now 
on the sensitivity of our results to some remaining factors. 
• We tested for sensitivity to the parameter 2d  in the bequest utility function 
(equation (8)) by setting 500002 =d  instead of 10000. There was little change 
in the results, indicating that they are robust relative to large changes in this 
parameter. 
• We considered the exponential utility function as an alternative to power utility. 
This gives rise to constant absolute risk aversion and decreasing relative risk 
aversion as a function of the initial investment )0(F . Our results suggest that 
the value of the RRA parameter, at the specified level of 100000)0( =F , is 
more important than the precise shape of the utility function.26 
• Our previous results were predicated on the assumption that pension income 
could be derived only from the initial fund )0(F . As a variant we looked at the 
possibility that this income could be supplemented by a level (e.g., state) 
pension, Ps , which cannot be commuted for cash. This we did by modifying 
))((1 tPJ  to 1))/())()((( 11 γγ SBS PPPtPh ++  with 5000=SP  (or about 2/3 of 
BP ). However, our results suggest that the introduction of a state pension into 
the model does not fundamentally alter our earlier conclusions. 
                                                          
26
 This observation relies on the assumption that we will follow a static investment strategy up to the 
time of annuitisation. It is well known that dynamic optimal strategies would evolve differently if 
exponential utility were used. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
Our results suggest that the best distribution programme does not usually involve a 
bequest, but rather pays regular survival credits to the plan member in return for the 
residual fund reverting to the life office on the plan member's death. On the other 
hand, the best programme does depend on the plan member's attitude to risk: if he is 
highly risk averse, the appropriate programme is a conventional life annuity; if he has 
a stronger appetite for risk, the best programme typically involves a mixture of bonds 
and equities, with the optimal mix depending on the plan member's degree of risk 
aversion; and if he has a very strong appetite for risk (i.e., an RRA less than 1.25), he 
will invest entirely in equities. However, if we accept Blake’s (1996) estimates of the 
range of risk aversion parameters found for UK investors, the equity-linked annuity is 
likely to be chosen by relatively few plan members (only about 5% of the total), and 
very few of these would choose to invest 100% of their retirement fund in equities. 
Our results also suggest a number of other conclusions: 
• The optimal choice of distribution programme appears to be fairly insensitive 
to the weight attached by the plan member to making a bequest. In particular, 
the weight would have to be substantially higher than that used here to make 
programmes with a bequest optimal.  
• The equity proportion chosen for the distribution programme has a considerably 
more important effect on the plan member's welfare than the distribution 
programme chosen, and a poor choice can lead to substantially reduced 
expected discounted utility. 
• Plan members in poor health relative to the average may, depending on the 
severity of their ill health, still prefer the ELA programme paying standard-rate 
survival credits to the ELID programme paying bequests. However, those in 
extremely poor health and attaching some weight to a bequest are rather more 
likely to prefer an income drawdown programme. 
• Forcing members of ELA programmes to annuitise at 75 rather than 85 can be 
expensive in terms of reduced expected discounted utility for those with low 
degrees of risk aversion: it is equivalent to 15% of the initial fund value for 
risk-neutral plan members. However, the costliness of this requirement declines 
